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VIRTUAlITY AND THE GHOST OF RELIGION
DANIEL BOUGNOUX
"You described me as a philosopher. I have no slides to show; I don't
work with machines, so I will stick to theoretical comments rather
than technological demonstrations. Of course 1'm concerned with
media and technological issues, because it is impossible to think
without media. For a philosopher, clearly, the media question is both
an intellectual challenge and a theoretical necessity.
Since we are speaking here of high culture and popular culture, it is important to note that
every culture reflects and distills a certain state of technological development. I will try to
sketch out several reflections around these notions of culture, media, and the work of art.
The question, the distinction, between elite culture and popular culture, mass culture,
industrial culture (as the Frankfurt School suggested we call it) ... indicates immediately to
me that there are actually three cultures. If we want to distinguish them arbitrarily, we
could call the one "literary/humanist culture;' the other "scientific culture;' and the third
"popular;' or "mass;' or "industrial" culture. Actually, what we are doing here is trying to
classify three ways of being together - as Philippe Queau explained when he described the
etymology of culture. Clearly, the word culture has an anthropological meaning. It refers to
the basic daily ways in which we form a group and live together. At the same time, with
the term "elite culture" we designate that which pulls us away from our daily, ordinary
lives. So with the same word we describe the community, and also that promise of univer-
sality, or longevity which characterizes the pretensions and the great works of high or elit-
ist culture. And to further complicate this irritating question of cultures and their terms,
which are always hard to articulate, one must recall that within the term "culture" lies the
ghost of religion ["le fantome des cultes"}; and that wherever you find actual religious feeling,
















religious worship promises supreme knowledge,
perfected social ties - with a feeling of greater
humanity or community - and aesthetic perfec-
tion. Of course we have lost religion, but I was
glad that in Mr. McCracken's talk he raised the
issue of a lesser god; this is something that I will
soon touch on myself.
So what has happened to art since, let's say,
Romanticism? What I mean to ask is, what
does it mean to say we are "modern"? I will try
to enumerate certain responses to this issue: pri-
marily WaIter Benjamin's famous conception in
an article relevant to our conference, "The Work
of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction".
In-fact, this morning Gail Lord spoke in detail
about a phenomenon that Benjamin condensed
into one word, the word "aura." Aura: the fact
that a work presents itself in its proper site, for
the first time, in a physical encounter (certainly
not a virtual one), and as a distinct object; but
which is not at all a close encounter, since Ben-
jamin defines the aura as "I'unique apparition d'un
lointain" [the unique phenomenon of a dis-
tance}. This conception of the aura was clearly
quite useful to the Frankfurt School in depreci-
ating the productions of mass culture as obvi-
ously lacking in aura, starting from the moment
when Walter Benjamin defined aura as the
unique phenomenon of a distance. And so,
because certain works or objects have this aura
there is a convergence, and ceremony, and voy-
age, toward these objects; while on the other
hand modernity seems to consist in mass cul-
ture, which distributes works directly to the
home as if they were hot water and gas, and
also, importantly, through the means of televi-
sion. So it follows that television should have
much less symbolic power because it has no
aura at all, though mass culture theorists and
critics have argued against these notions and we
know this debate by heart.
So, this concept of the aura is compelling
because it's clearly very familiar to us, very pal-
pable, "ery carnal, very strong, and, at the same
time; I think, very false in the way Benjamin
argues it. But let's give Benjamin's arguments a
chance. If I follow this train of thought, the
work in the museum is, by definition, at a dis-
tance. This means that no matter how terribly
close it seems, you are forbidden to touch it, and
this taboo makes the work sacred. This concep-
tion of aura is already a bit problematic, because
the museum itself constitutes a desacralization
compared to the former status that the works
occupied - which might have been, for exam-
ple, in a site of worship [des lieux de culte}. And
in a site of worship, of course, the sculpture or
painting is contained in a certain architectural
setting which mutes the focus on that object
itself. So clearly the museum is already an
incredible alteration and exaggeration of the
aura, because within a gallery the painting or
sculpture or object is in exile, and we have
moved from the site of the cult to the sight of
culture [on est passe du culte a la culture}. We have
moved from the value of sacred rituals-prayer,
kneeling, prostration-to the values of exhibi-
tion. So though the museum certainly sacralizes
its objects, this sacralization is an enormous
desacralization in relation to certain religious or
cultural states which precede the stage we call
"cultural" - the museum exhibition.
The museum causes that which was fixed,
the sculpture in the temple, to become a move-
able feast. Clearly mass culture or contemporary
art has accelerated this mobilization and this
reproduction (which, according to Benjamin's
arguments, are catastrophic). This mobilization
also produced Pop Art, which is in itself a kind
of acceleration, a powerfully explicit part of
movement. And, of course, we often resist our
reproduced objects with our works of art or our
works of culture, which are in themselves seri-
ally reproduced. We also resist constantly by
means of secondary resacralizations. For exam-
ple, when we have a work by some author, and
when this author makes an appearance and we
have him sign his own work, this is obviously a
way of resacralizing, reheating what had grown
cold in the serialized, mechanized object. This
rebirth/reconsecration is accomplished through
the experience of contact with a physical pres-
ence, and of a unique trace which the author has
willingly inscribed on the title page. So Ben-
jamin's concept, his critique, his theory of the
aura and of its continual loss within mass cul-
ture, i.e. in the mechanical reproduction of
works, this stimulating and tempting theory is
nonetheless highly questionable.
So, in discussing what has happened to art,
the second point to consider relates to a word
which has been spoken many times today, the
word "direct." For me, there is an important
distinction in media studies between "direct"
and "deferred" [differee - which in French also
means differentiated/varied}, and this is cer-
tainly a primary distinction in philosophy. So
when we think of the order of the book - and
this morning several speakers, particularly the
librarian Patrick Bazin, spoke of the order of
the book - certainly this order is deferred, and,
in most cases, the images, engravings and illus-
trations are also deferred, by definition. But a
certain type of image can, in a way, be seen as a
direct image. The principal category of this
type of image, of course, would be photogra-
phy. The photograph is direct in the sense that
where there is a photograph there is an imprint,
which is to say that the image has not passed
through an artist's mental conception or repre-
sentation, but is printed directly on film. And I
think that semiology can distinguish between a
painted canvas and a photograph - the former
is an icon while the latter is an indice in the
sense of Charles Pierce, and this concept of the
indice is compelling. This term helps to isolate
a certain type of image which is much more
direct than others. The photograph "is indicative
[indicielle} and this provides its poignant
aspect, its attestation of reality. If within that
piece of paper a face takes on a certain expres-
sion, necessarily there must have been, once, a
flesh-and-blood face which adopted or actually
manifested, honestly, that emotional expres-
sion. In this way photography represents a
remarkable acceleration of transmissions, a
remarkable short-circuit compared to the long
mental process of the traditional figurative
painter. And there too, modern art has multi-




















the chain of transmission. So in painting -
abstract, action, body-art, silk-screening, print-
ing - and the thousand and one other manifes-
tations of contemporary art there is a desire for
the indice rune pulsation indicielle}, a push
towards shorter circuits: not towards represen-
tation but towards presence. Couldn't we then
declare that the best possible indice is that the
thing itself is printed, not its representative nor
its simulacrum (despite the fact that in epi-
curean theories the simulacrum itself is the
indice)? But let us abandon these questions.
Briefly, I think that there is an important semi-
otic distinction to be made between the painted
canvas and the photographic image and that the
basic distinction is that of the direct vs. the dif-
fered, which helps explain our affective and
emotional responses to these image types.
So, to take up this history of the direct in
the twentieth century, primarily in art works
and in the museum - because our topic today is
the museum - I think it is clear that collages,
since Braque and Picasso, which include "le
readymade" as an extension of the collage mode,
should be seen as breakthroughs, or impulses
towards the indice [poussees indicielles} in the order
of iconic representations. Marcel Duchamp, the
creator of the first readymades, proposed for a
universal exhibition of surrealism to attach a
prosthetic bust to the flyleaf of the catalogue,
with this phrase written below: Please feel.
[Priere de toucher - which means literally: Pray,
touch} I think that "Please feel" could, with a
pun, be called a work of art [un oeuvre d'art} by
which I mean a work of dart [dard} which
pierces, pricks, or stings the gaze. So, through
these different manifestations of modernity,
the~e is, I think an increasing speed and impa-
tience. Perhaps here art is trying to catch up
with the information highway. And I say "trying
to catch up" because if it did, it would be a cer-
tain catastrophe for art - an art in the grip of
information, or, even worse, in the grip of com-
munication. These are my notations on the
modernist impulse.
The third notation concerns the concept of
semiotic fissure [coupure}. Semiotic fissure is an
easy thing to understand. It means that the sign
is not the thing, and that the representation (for
example, the use of words) consists in resorting
to artifacts or to virtual realities, since, after all,
the virtual begins with the alphabet, and even
before that - virtuality must have coincided
with "man's development" ["I'homminisation"},
and man is an animal who virtualizes everything
around him. But in particular, the world of
signs introduces a very strong fissure in'relation
to the biosphere, and so we know that the world
of signs is in fact the human realm. There is a
secret bliss [rejouissance} and a strong temptation
to fracture this semiotic hierarchy of the sign
and the thing, and a great pleasure can be found
in obliterating or suppressing this semiotic fis-
sure. This can be s'een quite clearly in many
contemporary aesthetic events and also, cer-
tainly, in mass culture. For example, theatre
exhibits semiotic fissure in a most solemn and
majestic way, since the stage distinguishes the
set from the "house" where the audience sits,
reinforcing the distinction between fiction and
reality. The order of the spectacle is thus
absolutely dominated by the idea of semiotic fis-
sure. I think it is clear to all of us that television
does not obey this device, and video games even
less so. We are no longer before the image, that
is to say with a clear cut distinction between our
presence and the representation, no longer with
a central perspective, a rational vanishing point,
a geometric construction - which are all con-
tained, as you know, within the theatrical space
- but instead with a new form of representa-
tion. Well, yes, there is television, a theme close
to Derrick de Kerckhove's heart, I think - the
image which imprints itself in us all. The spec-
tator-screen relationship is reversed to the
extent that the image becomes practically tac-
tile. And I say "practically" because this is a
subject which could be expanded upon; but,
admittedly the gaze becomes almost tactile, or
(even worse) the image becomes tactile as it
comes towards us more than our gaze seeks it.
The glowing TV screen could be likened to a
kind of neural tattoo. With this set-up, and also
with interactive video games - and, already,
with television, we are interactive through the
remote control (although Derrick will vigor-
ously contest the suggestion that TV is interac-
tive). In any case, through all these set-ups,
starting with television, there is a weakening of
the semiotic fissure - in all gripping devices, by
which I mean those that are tactile in terms of
the gaze. So in other words, we are gripped
within a spectacle which is no longer a specta-
cle. That's an old metaphor, the society of the
spectacle, an older way of imagining things
lifted from the theatrical stage and the semiotic
fissure it represents.
I would like to elaborate on this phenome-
non and these examples, which I find quite
promising, and which will allow me to show
that, with mass culture (and by modern or con-
temporary art in particular) we have moved
from representation to actual presence. We have
moved from observation to interaction, and we
seem to be moving from sight to tactile engage-
ment: from the icon to the indice. I think these
are two completely different semiotic systems.
In fact, one could say with McLuhan that the
message leans towards the massage, i.e. total
immersion into the flux; and that the object
tends to give us palpable environmental or
ambient experiences. This occurs, for example,
with modern dance, with those trances pro-
duced by the advent of ambient music, and with
all types of rock. The participant, who is no
longer a spectator, is invited to manifest, here
and now, strong sensations. This is a kind of
return of the aura, if you will. Though the con-
cept of the aura seems inconsistent to me,
because this "here and now" experience is effec-
tively a form of trance which is different from
the aura. After all, already with photography
(which is a reproducible genre) there is a great
surge of aura, in the ghost of presence. I think
that ultimately the notion of the aura has
become irrelevant, and should probably be left
behind, or at least problematized. Instead, in
mass culture there exist powerful affective,
experiential, participatory surges (which Ben-

















and call the effect of an aura) which are actually
built upon repetition, reproduction, and serial
copying.
In brief, technology and modernity do not
strip the world of its enchantment, but instead
help us return to the culte, to shamanism; but it
is doubtless a "dieu /aible;' a lesser god. I think
that the world of modern communication privi-
leges this dilapidated source, Mallarme's "rotten
but powerful source." Mallarme saw this rotten
source in certain layouts [dispositifs} or typo-
graphical technologies - and already we have
changed all of that. Perhaps we are no longer
the society of the spectacle, but rather the soci-
ety of contact and physical abuse.
So, my fourth point would be to ask if, with
the enormous promises of technology all around
us, we live at the end of the grand narratives.
We often speak of an irreducible pluralism. So,
what does history become? To live in a typo-
graphical society is to be a [hi}storyteller. Is the
unprecedented multiplying of world space and
its marvelous technologies of transmission and
communication actually drying up the well of
history? Are these openings actually disintegrat-
ing linear syntax that are forcing narratives to
crumble? Let's take an obvious instance; for
example, in my hotel room, in the dresser
drawer lies a Bible and on top of the dresser
stands the television. This means that I have a
coherent narrative hidden below (one which is
actually quite lacking in terms of factual infor-
mation), and displayed on top I have another
kind of information at my disposal - yet I can
completely fracture it with my remote control.
It's all just crumbs on the programming grill.
We live through this fractured information at
every moment. Perhaps this fracturing results
from the pressure of the real [le reel}, its tran-
scendence, which all knowledge, all memories,
all narratives force us to foreshorten, to mis-
apprehend [meconnaitre}, to forget. Modern nar-
ratives are haunted by the pruning which is
necessarily innate in all narratives. The modern
narrative, modern since Mallarme or Joyce - to
ci~e men abour whom I think McLuhan had
much to say, particularlyJoyce - this narrative
is the sharp crisis of realism because it repre-
sents a divorce between the real and the narra-
tive. The real is persistently outside of the
narrative, to one side of it. In Sartre's Nausea,
a novel which speaks clearly to this issue, the
author tells us we must choose between living
and narrating. And so, all modern literature is
an affront to or a denunciation of narrative lin-
earity in the name of something stronger or
more attractive, which is life, but which is
always outside, delayed, always to becontin-
ued.... So there is always the sting of bad con-
science in all these representations. This bad
conscience is no longer centred on the narrative
text, but upon the goal of universal atomiza-
tion, an atomization which is called democracy.
We can say that the ceremony is over, conver-
gence is finished, and of course the Republic,
the school, the pyramid, all that is vertical, and
several other things as well.
When I was flying here I watched a film on
the plane along with all the other passengers:
Sister Act II. This film addresses the question of
ceremony, of the lesser god, and of education. It
takes place in a Catholic school and the sisters
have no more funds to keep it open. So they
call Whoopi Goldberg, who has an angelic
voice, and she proposes that the multiracial and
anti-communitarian students form a choir.
.That's what the film is about, building a choir.
And because it's a mass culture film with a
happy ending, the choir will be constructed
around a work which will most certainly tri-
umph. The choral piece will be Beethoven's
"Hymn to Joy", but a "Hymn to Joy" sung in a
most anarchic and almost anti-communitarian
style. And at the end, don't you just know it,
Whoopi will say to the kids: "Rip off your uni-
forms, improvise, be who you really are." Each
one will really loosen up and give full rein to
her passions, and this very anarchism will cre-
ate the greatest and most triumphant of choral
songs. So the school is saved, the children sing
together, the community is restored, and the
good nun wins. But she's not really a good nun;
God is no longer transcendent. He has become
horizontal, or "lesser," and musical; God is now
musical and horizontal and the good nuns will
sell a lot of tickets and fundraise for the choir,
because good business is crucial to the success
~f their mission. So the film's final harmony is
optimistic, of course, and very liberal, because
we can all be who we are, and it will come
together anyway! And here lies an issue which
is relevant to this conference: how can we con-
struct a group out of music when the grand
narrative has been suppressed? Where is God,
and how does divine intervention fit in? Behind
the "Hymn to Joy" lies Beethoven - maybe
that's a strong enough reference upon which to
build a community ... Kant said of the work of
art: "It is the promise of a community." And
Adorno wrote more specifically about music
that: "Music is a way of harmonizing and a
model of how to be together. It's within music
that people feel the strongest bonds."
So here are several reflections - a bit of
channel sutfing, and as unordered as that. Let
me skip to the conclusion. I am in complete
agreement with Alain Renaud when he says
that we should not contrast the real with the
virtual. Because the notion of perception is
already a construct and produces a way of talk-
ing about what is real. In effect, we never do
anything except conflate, virtualize, construct.
Let's be constructionists - we have no choice,
the only thing we do is construct and recon-
struct. Since the dawn of human perception,
culture's path has been one of progressive
detachment. By this I mean, continual semioti-
zation. And also by this, I mean virtualization.
And this is the price we pay for universality. We
are universal to the extent that we are detached
and semiotized. But, when this detachment
grows too vast, when abstraction becomes too
mathematical, or too mechanical, then there is
the compensation of indicity. And through the
indice we express our desire to touch, out desire
to participate. We have spoken at great length
here today of the manufactuting or construction
of meaning and factories of meaning. Well, in
French the word "sens" [meaning} is a marvel-

































at once: the direction, the signification, and sen-
sitivity. I would say that the question of sym-
bolic mediation is quite an urgent one, and
contemporary art poses these questions in a very
acute way. It is a magnifying glass or micro-
scope poised to view democracy. In a democracy,
we are all "between ourselves;' by which I mean,
without transcendent mediation, without God,
without a vertical form of sacralization. But at
the same time democracy could be seen as vir-
tual, because it must constantly reaffirm its
relationship to those in positions of power, for
example, in relation to monarchy, where the
relationship is one of filial agreement. And so,
there is much to say about this virtual regime
in terms of its politics. It is at the same time
our own cultural system - that culture of mar-
velous images - and of course, the wider cul-
tural context starting with the origins of
democracy (the choice of the Occident, the
choice of an open society, not a closed one).
And so, this system is both permanent and also
just starting to happen. There, that's enough,
I think, for now."
Translated by Rachel Fulford
